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The aftermath of the September, 11 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States (U.S.) has led to renewed war on terrorism by the U.S. across the globe. This study assessed the efficacy of U.S. post 9/11 counterterrorism strategies in Somalia. Case study research design was adopted while documentary approach was adopted to obtain secondary data on U.S. counterterrorism and Al-shabaab terrorism in Somalia. U.S. post 9/11 intervention in Somalia is guided by its policy of pre-emption which aims at dislodging terrorist organisations and regimes supporting them across the globe. The study contends that prioritization of kinetic warfare by the U.S. and pursuit of national interest by some U.S. allies under the guise of dislodging perceived terrorist groups in Somalia created conditions for the emergence and resilience of Al-shabaab terrorism. This study pursues the thesis that Al-shabaab is a product of U.S post 9/11 intervention in Somalia. The experience of Somalia shows that military interventions by external actors without providing platform to build inclusive national government in failed and fragile states would only result in sustained violent extremism
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